Dissent, Disobedience and Defiance

Posted on February 7, 2026 by sword

Constructive dissent is essential to good military leadership — but it must occur within the decision-making process, not after the fact. Public post-retirement criticism by senior commanders risks crossing from professional dissent into defiance or disobedience.

There is a  deeply ingrained public perception that in professional armies worldwide following orders unquestioningly is a virtue, practically an absolute must. Bollywood’s “Sir, yes Sir” stereotype has long reinforced this image. But the truth is more nuanced. Blind obedience weakens an army. So does reckless dissent. What distinguishes great military leadership is constructive dissent — the ability for subordinates to challenge plans before decisions are final, and then accept the chosen course once it is made.

Healthy dissent is not mutiny. It is an indicator of moral and professional courage. The key lies in understanding the difference between dissent, defiance, and disobedience — concepts that are often grouped as one in public debate. The first occurs before a final decision, offered as reasoned, professional input. A commander who genuinely values collective decision-making welcomes it; it improves plans, anticipates risks, and deepens ownership among those who must execute. The second and third — defiance and disobedience — occur after decisions have been made. They undermine unity of effort or lead to deflection of blame later. So dissent belongs to the stage of deliberation. Defiance and disobedience belong to the stage of execution or after.

Great commanders invite the perspectives of those entrusted with execution before finalising any plan. As many in the military know well, open discussion usually produces stronger plans and prepares for contingencies. However, once the leader decides — taking into account dissenting views or dismissing them as per his judgement — the cycle of debate ends. At that point, what was once healthy dissent must give way to professional cohesion. To refuse orders after the decision is made is disobedience; to carry them out half-heartedly is defiance. Both are harmful to the operation in particular and the military environment in general.

A culture that permits — even encourages — such professional debate is a sign of institutional maturity. But if promotions reward yes-men over thoughtful challengers, dissent dries up, and the institution loses its edge. A “Baa Baa Black Sheep…” culture in the armed forces is extremely detrimental, not just to the organisational fabric, but in long term to national defence. 

India’s own military history offers a powerful illustration of how professional dissent can coexist with discipline. In 1959, as tensions with China escalated, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru found himself confronting a grim strategic reality: Chinese troops were constructing a road through Aksai Chin, deep in territory claimed by India. Despite repeated intelligence warnings and misgivings from career officers, the political leadership remained optimistic about Beijing’s intentions, dismissing them as benign moves to strengthen negotiating positions. Events in 1962 later showed how dangerous that strategic optimism had been.

When questioned in Parliament about what was being done to counter Chinese incursions, Nehru famously replied that the matter had been “handed over to the Army.” Army Chief General KS Thimayya knew that with the forces, resources, and communications infrastructure available at the time, India was not ready to meet a large-scale Chinese offensive. His dissent — grounded in professional judgement — was not heeded. Instead of bowing to that exclusion or engaging in defiance, he chose the one dignified way available to express resolute disagreement: he tendered his resignation. His act was neither defiance nor disobedience, but a principled assertion of professional truth. Nehru persuaded him to withdraw it, but then threw him under the bus by deflecting the reasons behind his move to personal differences with the Defence Minister Menon. (Details of how the incident unfolded is given in this thread.) Subsequently there was an uproar in the parliament when the opposition targeted the government over the episode. But the episode remains a powerful example of how senior military dissent can spotlight strategic misalignments without damaging institutional cohesion.

Contrast that with the recent uproar over the  memoir of former COAS General M.M. Naravane.  His reflections are yet unpublished but reports reveal moments when as the top commander he wrestled with complex operational choices and the interface between military advice and political direction. In his recounting of the 2020 border tensions, he describes periods of intense uncertainty, multiple calls to senior political leadership, and the tension of balancing restraint with readiness — the burden of command in a democracy. That he has chosen to go public in this manner, in contrast to the way in which Gen Thimayya dealt with a similar predicament, shows the moving away from a culture of constructive dissent. The key difference lies not in whether a General disagreed, but when and how that disagreement is expressed. Thimayya protested while in uniform, within the system, and accepted institutional outcomes. Public disclosures years later, after decisions have been executed and consequences absorbed, shift the act from professional counsel to retrospective judgement. That distinction matters deeply in a military organisation built on trust, confidentiality and collective responsibility.

Bottomline – there is wisdom in discipline, but there is also strength in the courage to dissent before a decision is final. The legitimacy of military leadership in a democracy rests on this balance: unity in execution, with openness in deliberation. But post facto criticism of decisions doesn’t come across as dissent. It seems to fall more under the category of defiance. And if sensitive operational matters are revealed without due clearance, the issue moves beyond ethics into the realm of institutional responsibility and legal obligation – ie disobedience. 

Armies do not run on silence. They run on honest counsel before decisions, and unquestioned commitment after. Confusing post-fact commentary with professional dissent weakens that foundation. If politicians will be politicians, soldiers too must remain soldiers — and Generals, above all, must remain Generals.

Posted in Blogitorial, Civil Military Relations, COAS, Higher Defence Management, National Issues | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Politicisation of the Armed Forces: Examining the Claims

Posted on October 24, 2025 by sword

A lot has been spoken and written about the politicisation of the Armed Forces in the recent past. The latest is a recent article in Deccan Herald by AVS Namboodiri which claims that in the recent past—presumably during the tenure of the current NDA government—”politicisation of the wrong kind, of a party-political or ideological nature, sometimes revolving around a political personality” is now affecting the Armed Forces. This piece aims to dissect the narrative about the politicisation of the Armed Forces in general and specifically examine the veracity of the claims made in this article, since it represents typical arguments given in favour of that narrative

Understanding Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy

First, it is necessary to establish a clear understanding of what constitutes politicisation and the proper relationship between the Armed Forces and the government.

In a democracy, a political party presents a manifesto laying down their intended policies and programmes to the electorate. Each party’s manifesto is based on the party’s ideology and beliefs on what’s the best for the nation. The party elected to form the government then formulates those stated policies and puts them into action. Once in office, it can no longer be viewed merely as a political party and it’s policies can not be viewed merely as political ideology. It is transformed into a legally elected government by the will of the majority of the people.

All instruments of the government are mandated by the people to follow the instructions of the government. Needless to say, various functionaries are within their rights to advise the government on the pros and cons of policies and decisions. The final decision, however, rests with the government, as does the accountability for the outcome of those decisions. The ultimate test of that accountability is the next election, when the people decide whether they agree with the policies of the past five years by either re-electing the government or throwing it out of power.

The Armed Forces are one of the organs of the nation through which the government exercises its security policies.It is incumbent on the Armed Forces to implement the policies of the government. Individual commanders who strongly feel that any such policies are inimical to national interest have the option of resigning—as Gen Thimmayya did in 1959 when he had a strong disagreement with the then Defence Minister VK Menon regarding the handling of the Chinese situation. Barring resignation, the military leadership in a healthy democracy has no option other than carrying out the orders of the government.

What Has Changed? Examining the Manifestos

Given this framework, let us examine what apparent changes have led to claims of politicisation. To do so, it is necessary to look at the election manifestos regarding stated policies on security and the Armed Forces.

BJP Manifestos: 2014 and 2019

In the 2014 manifesto, three pages were devoted to national security and the Armed Forces. Key points included:

  1. Greater participation of Armed Forces in the Ministry of Defence decision-making process
  2. Implementation of One Rank One Pension for Armed Forces personnel
  3. Construction of a War Memorial to recognise and honour the gallantry and sacrifice of soldiers
  4. Bolstering India’s indigenous arms industry and DRDO
  5. Revision and updation of the country’s nuclear doctrine

The 2019 manifesto stated that India’s security doctrine would be solely guided by national security interests, with zero tolerance against terrorism and a free hand to security forces in combating terrorism. It emphasised continued focus on operational readiness through induction of equipment and indigenisation of defence production.

Congress Manifestos: A Contrast

In contrast, the 2014 Congress manifesto has almost no clearly stated agenda for national security or the Armed Forces. Their 2019 manifesto spoke about security in generalised terms, the only specifics being the scrapping of the Agnipath scheme and institutionalising the selection process of the CDS.

A Clear Policy Difference

From the above, it is apparent that the BJP came to power with a clear vision of how they wanted the national security apparatus to function, including greater integration of the Armed Forces in decision-making and a more muscular security doctrine. Most of the points listed have either been carried out or are under implementation.

While erstwhile governments kept the Armed Forces at an arm’s length, the current dispensation has allowed it to become part of the decision-making process and paid closer attention to its functioning. Both of these are well within its prerogative.

It is this closer interface between the government and the Armed Forces—as opposed to the latter virtually functioning in a silo hitherto—that has likely led to allegations of politicisation. What appears to critics as politicisation may in fact be the implementation of an explicitly stated security policy that differs fundamentally from previous approaches. To examine this theory, let us analyse the specific allegations made by Namboodiri.

Analysing Specific Allegations

The Cult of Personality?

Namboodiri argues that “politicisation of the wrong kind, of a party-political or ideological nature, sometimes revolving around a political personality” is now affecting the Armed Forces. While he does not specify the personality, it is reasonable to assume he is referring to Prime Minister Modi.

In the past, Prime Ministers rarely visited forward troops, except in times of war. One of them even used military vessels and resources for a private family vacation. The current Prime Minister changed that trend—visiting more formations, air bases and ships than all the rest put together would have. He has even spent every Diwali since becoming Prime Minister with troops in some distant frontier, including recently on board INS Vikrant.

Do such visits serve to bolster the morale of the troops? Or do they contribute to establishing a cult of personality? Or both? Does it give him a political advantage? And if it does, is it legally, ethically or morally wrong for him to do so? That is for the reader to decide.

Supersession of Senior Officers

Namboodiri’s next point concerns Late Gen Rawat’s appointment as CDS, superseding two officers senior to him. He has a valid point here, since the principle of seniority has generally been followed in appointing the COAS and other senior military officers.

However, precedence for such supersession exists from the Congress era:

  • In 1972, Gen GG Bewoor was appointed COAS, superseding Lt Gen PS Bhagat, a Victoria Cross awardee
  • In 1983, Lt Gen SK Sinha was crossed over to appoint Gen AS Vaidya as COAS
  • In 1988, Air Marshal SK Mehra was appointed CAS, superseding Air Marshal MM Singh

The appointments in the Armed Forces are technically the prerogative of the government. While the prudence of overriding seniority can be debated, Namboodiri’s assertion that Gen Rawat was “considered to be overly responsive to the government’s sensitivities and demands” is intriguing. As established earlier, implementing government decisions—after providing professional advice—is precisely the job of the COAS. A COAS who is responsive to government orders is the norm, not an exception. The alternative—of the military acting independently or overriding civilian authority—is unthinkable in a democracy.

The Valid Concern: Canvassing for Position

Where Namboodiri has a genuine point—perhaps without fully realising it—is this: by setting aside the well-established practice of adhering to seniority, the government has sent a problematic message.

The adherence to seniority had solid reasoning. Given the pyramidal structure of armed forces and the absence of tangible measurable deliverables in peacetime, determining who is more competent for promotion becomes a subjective decision. Setting aside seniority has opened up the possibility of senior officers in line for promotion trying to curry favour with the government.

Whether this is actually happening would be difficult to determine for external observers. One hopes it is not the case. This is the only substantive concern raised in Namboodiri’s article that merits serious attention and rectification.

Government Taking Credit for Military Achievements

Namboodiri’s next assertion concerns the government taking credit for the achievements of the Armed Forces. Two points need to be made here.

First, the decision to take strong action in response to provocation through cross-border terrorism is a direct outcome of the muscular security doctrine outlined in the BJP manifesto. This stands in contrast to responses after earlier attacks such as the Mumbai attack on 26/11 and the Parliament attack, when military action was not authorised.

Second, while the success of any operation is undoubtedly an achievement of the Armed Forces, they require authorisation from the government to undertake the operation itself. Each has a distinct and essential role: the government provides policy direction and authorisation; the Armed Forces execute operations. Acknowledging the government’s role does not diminish the credit due to the Armed Forces.

Religious Symbols and Ceremonies

Namboodiri talks about changes in SOPs and inclusion of religious symbols such as ‘aartis’, ‘Om’ and ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ in parades and other functions. Here his knowledge about the Armed Forces seems limited, as such practices are not new.

Religious ceremonies are part and parcel of military life. Before every field firing, the unit pandit ji or granthi performs prayers for successful and safe conduct. Shastra pooja takes place in every unit on Dussehra. Different Regiments have religion based war cries depending on troop composition, including religious chants such as “Har Har Mahadev”, “Bole So Nihal Sat Sri Akal”, “Jai Mahakali, Aayo Gorkhali”, “Jwala Mata ki Jai” and “Raja Ram Chandra ki Jai”. In many Regiments, troops greet officers with “Ram Ram Saab”. When the President confers Regimental colours to a unit, they are consecrated by religious teachers during the ceremonial parade.

All these are age-old practices. It is unclear what change in SOP Namboodiri is referring to.

Public Statements by Service Chiefs

Namboodiri’s final concern is public statements made by Army and Air Chiefs, issuing threats to adversaries and discussing damages during recent operations—a departure, he says, from previous practices.

However, statements by service chiefs are expressions of government policy, issued with government consent. Greater aggression in these statements reflects the muscular security policy adopted by the government. Restrained statements by predecessors reflected the policy of restraint by then governments.

This must also be viewed in the context of the social media age, where appropriate messaging is part of psychological warfare strategy. Such statements carry more credibility when coming directly from the executors of policy.

Conclusion: Policy Implementation, Not Politicisation

All the instances cited by Namboodiri to suggest that the Armed Forces are being politicised are in fact indicators of changed security policy rather than party-political ideology infiltrating the military.

The government’s policies do stem from the ideology of the party forming the government—that is how democracy works. But it is not for service chiefs to sit in judgement on policy, irrespective of its source. As long as it is the enunciated policy of the government, they are duty-bound to implement it or, if they believe it is against national interest, resign.

What critics perceive as party ideology is in fact government policy. Government policy is national policy that the Armed Forces are duty-bound to implement. The closer integration of the Armed Forces in decision-making, the more muscular security doctrine, and the more assertive public messaging all flow from the explicitly stated manifesto commitments that brought the current government to power.

The only legitimate concern raised is the bypassing of seniority in promotions to senior ranks, which could lead to officers canvassing political leadership for appointments. This is something the government must examine and rectify to preserve the professional integrity of military appointments.

Posted in Appraisal System, Civil Military Relations, COAS, Democracy, Higher Defence Management, Military, National Issues, Politics, Promotion System | Leave a comment

Bhasma-nomics – A Modern Day Retelling of an Ancient Indian Tale

Posted on October 24, 2025 by sword

The purpose of mythology and folklore is to convey valuable lessons couched in fascinating stories. And those striding the corridors of power in Washington would do well to familiarise themselves with the ancient Indian story of Bhasmasur. He was a demon who acquired a boon to burn anything he touched. The boon turned into a curse when he destroyed himself in the arrogance begotten by the sense of invincibility that it bestowed upon him. 

The 21st Century Bhasmasur is armed, not with ash producing hands, but executive orders and tariff walls. The backdrop of the modern version is not Himalayan forests but the global geopolitical-economic stage. But the curse is once again entirely self inflicted.

In the story, Lord Shiva granted a powerful boon to Bhasmasur, to reward the arduous penances he performed. In the modern version, the boon was granted by the US policymakers to themselves. Instead of “whatever you touch will turn to ashes” the modern day boon was “whatever I tariff will protect my people and punish my rivals”. This was the doctrine of Bhasma-nomics.

When Bhasmasur received the boon, he was delighted like a child with a shiny new toy, and ran around touching things to try it out. Rocks, trees, animals – whatever came in his way he touched and burnt to ashes. The Washington avatar tried something similar – trying it out on Chinese semiconductors, European steel, and Indian goods and H1B visas. 

Expectations were that the enemy would burn down, and its own industry would rise from the ashes. But strangely, ashes began piling up on its own doorstep. Prices rose, supply chains broke. Farmers, manufacturers and retailers groaned. Yet, intoxicated with power the modern avatar of Bhasmasur smiled to himself and said, “Let me try one more tariff for good measure.”

In the ancient myth, the demon Bhasmasur was so delighted by the sense of power that it began dancing, one hand poised precariously over his own head. The Washington version did the same. Waltzing with Pakistani Generals, doing the Mambo with Syrian Warlords with eyes firmly fixed on that alluring jewel – the Nobel Peace Prize. And while we all know the end of the ancient tale, outcome of the modern day version is open to speculation.

In the original tale, Lord Vishnu took the form of Mohini to save the world from Bhasmasur’s destruction—enticing him into a dance where he ultimately placed his own hand on his head and turned to ash.
Who, then, is Mohini today?
Perhaps it is the global marketplace—calm, elegant, and indifferent—seducing every protectionist demon into dancing to her tune. No nation, however mighty, can resist her rhythm.
And already, supply chains re-route, trade blocs re-form, and countries once sidelined quietly take centre stage. India, Vietnam, and others smile politely as the new Bhasmasur dances faster and faster. 

To his own downfall?

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Brushes With Policing and Healthcare in UK

Posted on October 24, 2025 by sword

My laptop bag was stolen in London during a recent visit. I have no one but myself to blame for being careless enough to have let that happen. We were on a family holiday and had arrived by train from Oxford to London, walked down to the bus stand were waiting for the bus. We were four of us with eight pieces of luggage, including my laptop bag. My attention must have wandered for a minute and suddenly I realised that the bag was missing. It had my Macbook and iPad, and since I could track these on my iPhone, I could see the devices moving away from us rapidly. My son and I, along with a very helpful elderly gentleman from a nearby shop (God bless him), chased after the dots on the phone tracker indicating the location of the devices. Unfortunately the thief was faster, and apparently boarded the tube and got away before we could catch up.

The elderly gentleman advised me to call 999 and report the theft to the police, which I did immediately. The operator was most helpful and efficient, taking down all the relevant details and giving me the report number. I also promptly got an acknowledgement via text. I had emphasised to the operator that the devices are continuously being tracked by my phone, and if the police took immediate action they could apprehend the thief with the help of that. I even shared my login and password with the police, so that they could use the tracker. For the rest of the day, I constantly monitored the location of the devices, and was confident that the police were also doing the same and would soon contact me to confirm that the bag had been recovered. Well – that did not happen.

Next morning, really disappointed, and still able to see the location of the devices, I tweeted about it. Apparently the number of eyeballs my tweet was getting galvanised the police into action, and I got a call from them asking me if I could still see the location of the devices. I gave them the updated location, and pleaded with them to dispatch someone there immediately. I also told them that the login details had been shared with the police and would be in the report, and the officers going to the location could log in and track the devices in real time. My hopes were raised again, and I spent half a day in excited anticipation. Then I got a call again, saying that the officers had gone to the location, and it being a residential area they could not ascertain exactly which house to enter. Shortly afterwards I got a letter via email saying that my case had been closed. I would give full marks to them on their paperwork – if only their police work was half as good. I was thinking that a local beat cop in Delhi, given the location of stolen goods, would probably know who were the likely culprits in the area and wouldn’t take long to recover them.

Incidentally, my passport was also in the bag. I contacted the Indian High Commission, and went down there next day with the papers they had asked me to carry. Full marks to them for their efficiency, an Emergency Certificate to enable me to travel back was issued within half a day. In contrast, my request to the police for getting a copy of the crime report filed by me (to help my application for new passport) is still going back and forth over email. I think the London Metropolitan Police has more bureaucrats than cops.

Then came my nightmare with the British Healthcare system. My medicine was also in the bag, and I needed 5 days worth of one vital medicine to see me through the rest of the stay. The pharmacist obviously couldn’t help and advised me to get a prescription. I called the NHS helpline who asked me to go to Emergency at St Thomas hospital. The Emergency saw my Indian prescription and referred me to a GP. Waiting time to see the GP was 4 hours, and when our turn came the doctor was most understanding. She said that obviously I needed the medicine, she wanted to help me out, but the system wasn’t allowing her to write a prescription. The reasons she tried to explain went over my head.

I reached out to a friend who had been posted at the Indian High Commission earlier, and he connected me with an Indian doctor. The kind gentleman explained to me that there was no legitimate way for him to prescribe the medicine to me without me undergoing tests – which, besides being expensive, would consume precious vacation time.

Ultimately it was good old Indian Jugaad to the rescue. Understanding my predicament over one measly strip of medicine, he promised to help me out. He told me to go to a particular pharmacy in Southall run by an Indian gentleman, and that he would speak to the person concerned there. I went to the pharmacy, gave the name of the doctor, and was given the medicine. The good Samaritan did not even let me pay for it despite my insistence.

So in the ultimate analysis Indian bhaichara trumped the “advanced” Medicare system of NHS.

I came away from UK minus my devices but with a newfound appreciation of Indian systems – policing, healthcare and consular services.

PS – Two weeks later, I can still see the location of my devices. I open the app once in a while and wistfully look at it. What more can I do? The only consolation I have is that the thief will also never be able to use the devices thanks to Apple’s theft protection.

Posted in Blogitorial, Law and Order, Ponderings | Leave a comment

Let Flying Jets Fly

Posted on May 22, 2025 by sword

During the ongoing Operation Sindoor, there’s been much noise—claims and counterclaims—about Pakistani assertions of having shot down several Indian fighter jets. This isn’t unusual. In conflicts between long-time adversaries like India and Pakistan, truth often becomes the first casualty—sacrificed at the altar of domestic political compulsions.

A good example is the 1965 war. Pakistan claimed it destroyed over 600 Indian tanks, losing only around 150–190 of its own. India, on the other hand, estimated 471 Pakistani tanks lost, including 97 captured in working condition. Neutral military historians tend to agree more with India’s numbers, which were also supported by physical evidence—like the captured tanks at Patton Nagar.

Now, in 2025, Pakistan claims to have shot down more than five Indian jets. India has chosen not to issue a direct rebuttal. The Director General of Air Operations (DGAO) merely stated that “all our pilots have returned safely”—a remark open to interpretation. Does it mean no jets were hit, or just that pilots bailed out safely?

Notably, Pakistan hasn’t offered any credible proof—no wreckage, no video, no radar visuals. Despite this, some voices in India, including the Leader of the Opposition, are demanding that the government “own up” if there were any losses. This is not just politically naïve; it borders on irresponsibility. In an environment where information warfare is as critical as battlefield strategy, such demands play straight into the adversary’s hands.

The government’s silence may well be strategic. In modern warfare, ambiguity can be a weapon too.

Let’s consider two scenarios:

1. If India did lose aircraft

Why hide it? Losses are unfortunate but expected in military operations. In India’s democratic setup—with social media, smartphones, and satellite imagery—it’s nearly impossible to hide wreckage or damage for long. If concealment was attempted and later exposed, the backlash would outweigh any short-term gains.

2.  If India didn’t lose aircraft

Then why not deny the claims outright? Why not show the jets on the tarmac to a group of journalists?

One possibility is that India used decoys or deception to mislead Pakistan, allowing it to believe it scored hits on real assets. If that’s the case, letting the ambiguity linger is smart strategy. It sows doubt in the adversary’s mind and could prove useful in future encounters.

In either case, decisions on what to reveal—or conceal—are likely taken based on military and intelligence assessments, not political calculations. If anything, the government stands to lose more politically by appearing evasive.

Those demanding public disclosures on sensitive operational matters should remember: national security isn’t a press conference. It’s a long game, often played in the shadows. And in that game, a little silence can be louder than a thousand soundbites.

Posted in Blogitorial, Military, National Issues, Politics | 2 Comments

Op Sindoor – An Analysis

Posted on May 11, 2025 by sword

As the dust settles after Operation Sindoor, here’s an early assessment of not just of what India did, but why it did so, under what constraints, and with what results. In many ways, Operation Sindoor may prove to be a turning point in India’s approach to Pakistan’s decades-long proxy war. It was a limited military operation with disproportionate strategic value—achieving deterrence, demonstrating capability, and avoiding the trap of escalation.

Aims and Constraints

The core aim of Operation Sindoor was not territorial conquest or all-out war—it was to raise the cost of state-sponsored terrorism for Pakistan. After years of restraint, diplomatic démarches, and two minor cross border operations, India decided that greater but calibrated force was necessary to impose consequences. The operation possibly aimed to Inflict damage on terrorist infrastructure and deter future attacks. It would need to do so while minimising casualties to Indian forces and civilians on both sides and preventing the conflict from spiralling beyond the nuclear threshold. This was a high-stakes balancing act—militarily forceful, but strategically restrained.

Why Not War?

A full-scale war may appeal to public sentiment, but it is rarely a wise course in today’s geopolitical reality. War without a clear and achievable political end-state becomes an exercise in attrition. What would we have aimed to achieve? The capture of territory? Regime change? Balkanisation of Pakistan?

Even the global superpowers have learned the limits of military power:

• The United States, despite overwhelming superiority, could not achieve lasting stability in Iraq or Afghanistan, even though its mainland was untouched.

• Russia, with its ongoing war in Ukraine, has paid a massive economic and human cost while failing to secure a decisive outcome.

India, unlike them, faces a nuclear-armed neighbour with a fragile internal structure and a proven willingness to escalate unpredictably. Any action had to factor in this calculus.

The 1971 Comparison—and its Limits

Some have drawn parallels to the 1971 war. But the analogy is misleading. Then, India had a humanitarian and moral cause and a clear objective for an all out war —Bangladesh was in the throes of genocide and the world sympathised. The situation in Balochistan today, while serious, lacks the political unity, popular mobilisation, and international attention that East Pakistan commanded in 1971.

Moreover, even in 1971, India did not achieve all its objectives—notably, the recovery of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. And the economic aftershocks of that war were severe, contributing to the internal instability that culminated in the Emergency of 1975.

What Did Operation Sindoor Achieve?

India achieved far more than it may appear at first glance:

• Significant tactical success in degrading terrorist infrastructure.

• Psychological blow to Pakistan’s military and political leadership—raising doubts about their credibility at home.

• Tested military readiness and inter-agency coordination in real conditions.

• Raised the threshold for future retaliation—calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff yet again.

• Minimum casualties, and no loss of moral standing in the international arena.

• International pressure maintained through forums like FATF, and scope to increase water and trade pressure remains open.

Importantly, India maintained strategic autonomy: it responded on its terms, chose when to stop, and didn’t yield an inch on core positions.

The Ceasefire: Strategic Pause, Not Capitulation

Some argue that halting operations squandered momentum. But this ignores a key fact: restraint is not weakness when it follows successful action. By pausing after signalling capability and will, India preserved its diplomatic capital and avoided unnecessary costs. More importantly, it retained the option to strike again—politically, economically, or militarily—if provoked.

A limited victory in one battle does not end a war, but it shapes how the next one begins. India has changed the rules of engagement and made it clear that there is a price to pay for every misadventure across the border.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor was not a grand spectacle like 1971, nor was it meant to be. It was a precise, disciplined use of force designed to alter behaviour without triggering catastrophe. India has shown it can act decisively, yet responsibly. The war on terrorism is far from over—but in this round, India has come out on top.

Posted in Blogitorial, Boundary Dispute, Counter Terrorism, Military | 32 Comments

Rules, Fools and Exceptions

Posted on February 21, 2025 by sword

A recent post by a retired bureaucrat about rules and precedents reminded me of an interesting and educational encounter I had with regulations a couple of decades ago. The year was 1993, and the place was Chandimandir. But let me start at the beginning.

I got married at the age of 23—yes, a tad young. In the Army, marriage before 25 is informally discouraged, though not explicitly prohibited. One subtle deterrent is that officers below 25 are not entitled to married accommodation. I didn’t give it much thought at the time since my wife and I were quite happy in the two-room set within the regiment’s officers’ mess during the first two months of our marriage.

Then, I was detailed for a six-month course in Ahmednagar, where we were again provided ad hoc accommodation—a single large room in a repurposed stable, aptly named Ghoda (Horse) Barracks. These barracks housed numerous newlywed officers, each occupying a similar room. Immediately after the course, I was posted to Chandimandir as ADC to the Army Commander. Once again, we settled into a two-room set in the officers’ mess, content with our arrangement and mess dining facilities.

One day, the Station Commander—a brigade commander responsible for station matters, including accommodation—came to call on my boss, the Army Commander. While waiting in my office, he engaged in small talk, likely seeking insights into the station’s housing situation from someone at the grassroots level.

“How is your house, young man?” he asked.

I resisted the urge to quip, “What house?” and instead replied with due decorum, informing him that my wife and I were staying in the mess. He looked at me in disbelief. There was no shortage of accommodation in the station, and given that the ADC to the Army Commander was a privileged appointment, he saw no reason why I hadn’t been allotted a house.

“Why?” he asked.

I explained that I was not yet 25 years old.

“So?” came his next question, blunt and to the point.

Not grasping his confusion, I stated the obvious: “Sir, officers below 25 years of age are not authorized married accommodation.”

“Says who?” he shot back.

Having researched the matter thoroughly before getting married, I had my response ready. “Special Army Order 10/S of 86, sir.”

Our conversation was interrupted by the red light outside the Army Commander’s office turning green, indicating he was ready to receive his visitor. As the brigadier stood to leave, he instructed me to fetch the Army Order. Being the diligent staff officer that I was, I not only retrieved the document but also highlighted the pertinent sentence: ‘Officers below 25 years of age will not be authorized married accommodation.’ There it was, in black and white—unambiguous and definitive.

When the Station Commander returned, I handed him the highlighted page. He glanced at it, then pushed the book back toward me.

“Open the first page,” he said.

I complied.

“Read the last line of the first paragraph.”

I did. It read: ‘There will be no deviation from these rules except with the sanction of the Station Commander.’

The penny dropped.

With a knowing smirk, he looked at me and said, “So why haven’t you asked me for a sanction?”

Ten days later, we moved into a freshly whitewashed two-bedroom house—the entitled accommodation of a Captain.

Beyond the newfound domestic bliss, this experience left me with a lasting lesson. I had often heard the phrase, ‘Rules are for fools.’ That day, I understood its true meaning. Rules are created to be followed in spirit, not just to the letter. That’s why they include provisions for exceptions, allowing appropriate authorities the discretion to interpret them judiciously. The wise navigate these nuances to uphold the intent of the law, while the uninformed rigidly adhere to its wording, missing the bigger picture.

Posted in Management, Military, Welfare | Tagged , , | 17 Comments

Mind Over Merit

Posted on January 11, 2025 by sword
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In a recent piece in The Print, Gen Panag discusses the recent government decision to adopt a ‘merit based’ approach over ‘seniority based’ on the promotion of Lt Gens, and opines it is a move in the right direction. He also points out some shortcomings and offers suggestions to make the system of promotions to apex ranks in the Army further effective. While I don’t disagree with the General’s assessment of the current system, he has missed out a critical piece of the puzzle which I would like to highlight. And that is the issue of merit in promotion UP TO the rank of Lt Gen needs to be addressed as well to really make the changes worthwhile.

The first level of merit based selection takes place when the officers face the selection board for promotion from the rank of Lt Col to Col, currently at about 16 years of service. In this board, number of officers selected depends on the number of vacancies available. However, these vacancies themselves are divided between the different Arms and Services within the Army. Thus, say if a total of 300 vacancies for promotion are available in General Cadre, 10 may go to Armoured Corps, 10 to Mechanized Infantry, 30 to Artillery, 30 to Engineers and similar numbers to other combat support arms, while about 200 go to Infantry. These figures are illustrative, the distribution of vacancies is pro-rata, based on the overall strength of each arm. While this pro-rata distribution of vacancies has it’s logic, it is the first stage at which the overall merit of the batch gets disrupted. It results in a number of officers from arms other than Infantry who are higher in overall merit getting weeded out while those much lower in merit in Infantry being promoted. For instance, in the batch of 300, an officer from Mechanized Infantry who is 30th in the overall merit will not get promoted is he’s 11th among the Mechanized Infantry officers, while the officer from Infantry who is 200th in the overall batch merit will get promoted if he’s 199th in Infantry. By selecting someone 200th in the batch over another who is 30th, the merit for General Cadre begins being skewed at the very first stage. 

The compromise of overall merit continues in the ranks of Col and Brig because of the pro-rata vacancy allotment in career courses like Higher Command, Higher Defence Management Course and National Defence College (NDC). Due to steepness of the promotion pyramid, officers who are not nominated to attend these courses are almost certain not to be promoted to the next rank. Thus, out of the 10 who had been promoted to Col from Mechanized Infantry, only 6 may attend the career courses. The other four would be weeded out despite being higher in merit than a large number of Infantry officers who do get detailed purely because of larger number of vacancies in the courses for the arm. A similar weeding out takes place when Brigs are detailed for NDC course. It is notable that this vacancy based pro-rata system for promotions and nominations was not in vogue earlier, and was introduced only in the 90s for various reasons. You can refer to this for more details on the origin of the vacancy based pro-rata system.

As a result of this culling at various levels, the officers facing the selection board in the rank of Maj Gen do not truly represent the full potential of merit of the batch. If fair and equitable merit based appointment at the apex level of command have to be ensured, it needs to be applied from the very first promotion board itself, and ensured throughout the selection process right up to the rank of Lt Gen.

That having been said, the subjective nature of determining the merit at each stage itself needs to be addressed. Due to the nature of its functioning in peace time, there are no quantifiable deliverables on which officers at various ranks can be objectively assessed. As a result, the ACRs are bound to be based on the subjective opinions (and, unfortunately, sometimes the biases) of the Initiating and Reporting Officers up the chain of command. One way to reduce, though admittedly not completely eliminate the subjectiveness in assessment is to introduce a well thought out 360 degrees reporting system.

The aspect of regimental / arm based nepotism mentioned by Gen Panag is a sad reality. An unbiased examination of results of the Maj Gen to Lt Gen promotion board results over the past decade, tracking the merit graph of those not selected over their careers and identifying the stage and reason for the drop in merit would be instructive.

If these shortcomings in the merit based selection system up to the rank of Lt Gen are addressed, the pool of officers available for apex level appointments would be a truer representation of the best talent of the batch. It would then make the proposed exercise of merit based selection of Lt Gens truly meaningful.

A final word of caution regarding the drawback of doing away with the seniority based promotion of Lt Gens. There is a possibility of the temptation of senior officers ‘playing the tune considered melodious’ to the political leadership. One of the functions of senior leadership of an organisation like the Armed Forces is to provide unfiltered and unbiased inputs to the political leadership, whether they are palatable or not. The perception that such plain speak might mar promotional prospects may discourage any dissent no matter the desirability of plain speak in organisational interest.

Government driven Initiatives to optimise the effectiveness of Armed Forces through merit based promotions are a welcome step. For these to be truly meaningful, a deeper dive into the overall treatment of merit even during the early service career needs to be studied and addressed.

Posted in Appraisal System, Blogitorial, Higher Defence Management, Military, Promotion System, Reforms | Tagged , , | 5 Comments

1965 – No Victor no Vanquished?

Posted on August 3, 2023 by sword

The 1965 India – Pakistan war was brought to an end on 22nd September 1965 by a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The situation on ground as on that day in various sectors was such that India had a markedly upper hand. In Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistani raiders launched through the Line of Control across the entire state under their Operation Gibraltar had been stopped, killed, captured or beaten back . The strategically important Hajipir Bulge had been captured by India. Pakistani armoured offensive under ‘Operation Grand Slam‘ in the Aknoor sector had been beaten back. The Indian 1 Armoured Division had broken through the initial lines of Pakistani defences and was poised inside Pakistani territory, ready to threaten Sialkot. The Indian offensive in Punjab, in the Amtrisar – Lahore sector, was progressing well, with a foothold having been established on the Icchogil Canal. The Pakistani counter-offensive in Punjab, in the Khem Karan Sector, had been blunted and beaten back. Scores of Pakistani battle tanks scattered around Khem Karan and Asal Uttar – some destroyed and others abandoned in perfect working condition – bore testimony to the total rout of Pakistani Armoured Division leading this thrust. Under these circumstances, the ceasefire came as a welcome face saving exit for Pakistani government and Army – which were virtually the same thing.

Subsequently, under the Tashkent Agreement of 10th January 1966, signed between PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan, both forces gave up the territorial gains and status quo ante was ensured. Under the Agreement, the countries agreed –

The death of PM Shastri the same night, hours after signing the Tashkent Agreement, is still shrouded under a veil of myriad unanswered questions. President Ayub continued as a lame duck head of state for another few years before he was finally forced to resign in 1969. For India, the outcome, though not an outright victory, did come as a redeeming factor after the ignominious defeat by China in 1962. The Pakistani side, typically, continued to claim it as a thumping victory, and their populace is still under this misplaced belief that unlike 1971, 1965 war was won by them. Indian commentators have been more realistic in accepting the outcome as a stalemate.

Looking back at the events from the vantage point of half a century later, and the added luxury of a dispassionate perspective via the lens of de-classified CIA documents, some questions remain unanswered. Here are extracts of the relevant CIA Intelligence Memorandum with some key highlights that emerge from underlined text.

Analysis of the document and subsequent events indicate that –

  • The hostilities were initiated by Pakistan who infiltrated guerrillas led by regular army personnel into Kashmir, and due to any Indian aggression as long claimed by Pakistan.
  • The end was indecisive, due to a ceasefire which both sides were reluctant to agree to.
  • India had made substantial gains in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors besides having captured the strategic Hajipir bulge in Jammu and Kashmir.
  • Pakistan had ‘contained’ the Indian forces, but were unable to ‘bring them to their knees’. This means that Indian forces had been temporarily halted. They had made substantial territorial gains as above, and if they had even continued to hang on to their ‘contained’ positions, Pakistan couldn’t muster the strength to evict them.
  • The military cost to Pakistan was substantially higher.
  • Pakistani public had been led to believe by government propaganda that they were winning the war. An end to the war without any gains in Kashmir was therefore difficult for their leadership to sell to their people.
  • Bhutto even threatened to pull out of the UN if the Kashmir issue was not resolved.
  • India’s firm refusal to discuss Kashmir led to his bluff being called.
  • Under these circumstances, Ayub was considerably weakened, and the document predicts (quite accurately, as subsequent events proved) the threat of secessionism in East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh).
  • Shastri, on the other hand, had emerged much stronger. Having taken over as Prime Minister after the death of and under the long shadow of Nehru, he would no longer be considered as an insignificant entity after a decisive victory over Pakistan.

All of above indicates that if the ceasefire had not been imposed, India was on the trajectory to a clear victory akin to the one it finally achieved in 1971. Therefore, India’s acceptance of the ceasefire, subsequent concessions at Tashkent and the mysterious death of PM Shastri hours after signing the Agreement remain a mystery unexplained to date. Some of the questions that remained unanswered are –

  • What prevented India from pressing home its advantage on the battlefield, or even from bargaining hard at Tashkent to gain some advantages rather than settle for status quo ante?
  • Would an assertive India under a strong leader (as Shastri had proved himself to be) without having to look over it’s shoulders towards a weakened Pakistan be inconvenient to the global power equations as envisaged by the superpowers?
  • India’s inability to convert the decisive military victory in 1971 into significant political gains begs similar questions.

Who were these vested interests that brought about these outcomes? More importantly, now that India is asserting itself economically, diplomatically and militarily once again, and Pakistan is virtually heading towards a failed state status, would such vested interests not be threatened again? Won’t they use every trick in and outside the book to limit and contain India? Are we seeing signs of this around us, in other forms, in the run up to the 2024 elections? Who are these interests and what is their reach?

Paranoid fancies or viable conjectures – left to your judgement.

Posted in Military, Military History, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , | 3 Comments

Uniformly Crazy

Posted on April 26, 2023 by sword

All soldiers take great pride in their uniform. It sets them apart as a select group of people who take up arms in defence of their country and are willing to take or give lives in the line of duty. Military uniforms are as old as organised armies. They originated to distinguish soldiers across the world from civilians during times of war and also identify them as those who were permitted to bear arms in times of peace. From being more ostentatious, colourful and flashy in the earlier times, they have evolved to utilitarian and functional attire for the modern battlefield. Traces of the erstwhile pageantry is retained in the ceremonial uniforms such as mess dresses and those worn on ceremonial occasions such as parades and funerals. 

Wearing of uniforms has always been governed by very strict instructions, laid down in the dress regulations of each service. To give the uninitiated an idea about the details to which these instructions go down to, here are a couple of pages from the Army Regulations of India Volume VII (Dress) dated 1912. 

This would give you an idea about the detail in which what, how and when each article of is uniform to be worn is specified. The current version of Dress Regulations are much briefer and simpler, since the variety and complexity of the uniforms have been simplified. Yet, uniforms of the armed forces continue to be closely regulated both in terms of the specifications and the occasions on which what can or cannot be worn.

After ‘shedding their uniform’ or retiring, veterans understandably continue to retain their love for the uniform they have donned with pride for most of their lives. It is also a traumatic process to transition from a well regulated, orderly environment to the chaos and disorder of the world outside the cantonments. The loss of authority also comes as a blow. From being instantly obeyed, saluted, feted and looked up to for decisions, one is suddenly reduced to being an ordinary joe, not distinguishable from other men on the street. While the majority take this in their stride and adjust, a few find it difficult to shed the trappings of service. Possibly hating the thought of not being distinguishable from the ‘bloody civilian’ next to them, they go to ridiculous lengths to announce to their past to the world at large. This is usually done by wearing some articles of uniform on civilian clothing, particularly during public functions or while appearing on television shows. This disease is more prominent amongst those who retire from ‘star’ ranks. Not only are they keen to display that they are veterans, but also emphasise the high rank they retired from. They do this through embroidered stars corresponding to their ranks on various parts of their clothing. 

There is another category of veterans who want to leverage the love that the common people have for the armed forces for furthering their political careers. They use articles of uniform while attending political events and on political posters.

This thread has numerous instances which illustrate the misuse of articles of uniform for various purposes discussed above.

It is not that veterans are completely barred from wearing uniform altogether. The dress regulations also lay down the forms and occasions on which veterans can wear certain articles of uniform. For instance the wearing of medals / miniature medals are governed by Para 666 of the Regulations for the Army (1987) as under – 

While the veterans are no longer under the Army Act and hence these Regulations cannot be enforced, unauthorised wearing of uniform or articles of uniform is also a punishable offence under Section 140 of IPC. In the current security environment there have been instances where terrorists have resorted to wearing military uniforms while carrying out attacks. The army is thus hard pressed to prevent the misuse of military uniform by unauthorised persons. Under such circumstances the misuse of articles of uniform by veterans sets a bad precedent before the public at large. And in most cases, the overt display of military rank and credentials in public by veterans makes them object of lampoon amongst the general public, who are too polite to point it out to them. The onus is therefore on the veteran community itself to stop this crass practice through peer pressure by highlighting such misuse at various fora. And if that does not work, the authorities may have to step in and take appropriate legal measures to enforce the regulations in extreme cases.

Posted in Blogitorial, Military, Veterans | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments